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Introduction 
Georgia enacted the special purpose local option sales tax for education (ESPLOST) in 1996, giving school 
districts in the state the opportunity, with voter approval, to adopt a 1¢ sales tax with revenue earmarked 
for capital outlay. The ESPLOST has proven to be extremely popular with voters, as all but one county in 
the state have passed at least one ESPLOST referendum, each of which remains in effect for a maximum 
of five years. As shown in Table 1, most counties have approved the tax four times, while a handful have 
had five or six ESPLOSTs approved. The vast majority of counties (132) have had an ESPLOST in effect 
continuously since first passage, with only three counties allowing the tax to lapse. Therefore, the 
ESPLOST has become, in effect, a permanent statewide 1 percent sales tax. 
Table 1. The Popularity and Permanence of ESPLOST 
NUMBER OF 
ESPLOSTS  
PER COUNTY TO DATE 
COUNTIES WITH AN ESPLOST  
IN PLACE UNTIL AT LEAST 2017 
COUNT OF COUNTIES BY ANY 
INTERRUPTIONS IN ESPLOST SINCE FIRST 
IMPLEMENTED 
No ESPLOSTs = 1* 
2 ESPLOSTs = 5 
3 ESPLOSTs = 15 
4 ESPLOSTs = 126 
5 ESPLOSTs = 11 
6 ESPLOSTs 1 
Yes = 143  
No = 16 
 
None = 132 
Yes but Reinstated = 24 
Yes and Not Reinstated = 3** 
* Burke County 
** Burke, Hancock and Towns counties 
Source: Georgia Department of Revenue Sales Tax Rate History Chart Effective April 1, 2016 
Note: Counties pass and collect ESPLOST and then distribute the funding to the associated county and city systems, so the count 
of school districts in these categories is slightly larger with similar proportions. 
The ESPLOST is a unique approach to financing capital outlay for education. Capital outlay is traditionally 
financed through municipal bond debt, sometimes referred to as “pay-as-you-use” because debt service 
payments often match the useful life of the asset. The ESPLOST allows school districts to substitute 
current revenues for debt financing. Current financing is sometimes referred to as “pay-as-you-go” 
because the assets are fully paid for as they are constructed. Moreover, rather than relying on general 
revenues, it provides an earmarked funding source that is only available for capital outlay and must be 
approved directly by voters.1 The ESPLOST has now been available in Georgia for 20 years and through 
several economic boom and bust cycles, making this an opportune time to reexamine its relationship to 
funding equity, capital outlay and debt. 
This report examines a range of policy issues related to the ESPLOST, including the distribution of 
revenues, and the relationship between the ESPLOST and school district debt and capital outlay needs. It 
begins by reviewing previous research on the Georgia ESPLOST specifically and alternative revenue 
                                                            
1 Counties may issue bonds backed by ESPLOST revenues at the time the ESPLOST is approved. Because debt service on the 
bonds must be paid solely with ESPLOST revenue, it would still be considered pay-as-you-go financing. 
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sources for capital outlay more generally. It then examines the ESPLOST’s effect on school finance equity 
in Georgia over time. Next, the report discusses the relationship between school district debt and 
ESPLOST revenue. Analysis of changes in capital outlay over time follows, and a final section provides a 
summary and policy recommendations. An appendix describes the data sources for each analysis and the 
methods used to calculate the inequality measures. 
Previous Research on Sales Taxes for Capital Outlay 
Given the relatively infrequent use around the United States of local sales taxes to fund facilities 
investments, or capital outlay, it is not surprising that the research on these taxes is limited. Several 
articles, however, have examined Georgia’s ESPLOST specifically or local sales taxes for capital outlay 
more generally. 
Rubenstein and Freeman (2003) analyzed the effects of Georgia’s ESPLOST on school finance equity 
during the program’s early years in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Voter approval of ESPLOST was 
already widespread, with 165 of 180 districts enacting one within the first six years of the program. The 
authors found that districts with large property tax bases also tended to have large sales tax bases and 
that the ESPLOST revenue increased disparities in funding across districts above what they would 
otherwise be. Although the state’s capital outlay program was designed to provide more resources to 
low-wealth districts, it was not large enough to offset differences across districts in tax bases. Brunner 
and Warner (2012) produced a follow-up study on school facility funding in Georgia and found that the 
ESPLOST had significantly increased school capital outlay funding in Georgia overall, but that wide 
disparities in funding across districts remained. They also found that districts with larger sales tax bases 
tend to be urban with higher levels of income and education. Finally, they reported that school 
construction needs in Georgia were expected to decline as enrollment growth slowed. 
Zhao and Wang (2015) studied the effect of Georgia’s ESPLOST on capital outlay disparities and reported 
lower capital outlays on average in South Georgia districts with higher percentages of African American 
residents and higher poverty. They also found that disparities across districts were substantially larger for 
capital outlay than for operating expenditures. 
Brunner and Schwegman (2016) examined the Georgia ESPLOST’s effects on school district capital outlay 
and debt. They found that adoption of an ESPLOST led to higher capital outlay and reduced debt for 
districts located in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in Georgia. For districts outside of MSAs, they 
found evidence of higher capital outlay but not reduced debt. Though ESPLOST revenue is restricted to 
capital outlay and debt reduction, they also reported that the tax increased current spending per pupil in 
districts within MSAs. 
Benson (2015) examined the relationship between the ESPLOST and expenditures on various categories 
of capital outlay. He also surveyed a sample of district administrators and school board members on their 
opinions about the ESPLOST. He found that inflation-adjusted expenditures for capital outlay increased 
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after the ESPLOST went into effect, though not by a statistically significant amount, and that expenditures 
for new construction and renovation became more equitable across districts. He also reported that 
administrators in urban districts felt the ESPLOST was more effective than did administrators in rural 
districts.  
Zhao and Hou (2008) analyzed the general purpose local option sales taxes (LOST) in Georgia, including 
potential tax exportation, meaning the sales taxes paid by people shopping outside their county of 
residence. They estimated that 76 counties were tax importers (net beneficiaries of exporting), and 83 
were exporters. The largest beneficiaries of tax exportation were regional retail centers, not necessarily 
districts in the metro-Atlanta area. They also found that tax base inequalities increased between 1970 
and 2000 and that sales taxes were more unequally distributed than property tax revenues. The authors 
used two models to examine tax base inequality. Using a representative tax system model, they found 
that LOST revenue did not increase overall revenue disparities during this period, whereas the income-
with-exporting model suggested that it did. 
In a study of North Carolina rather than Georgia, Wang and Zhao (2010) examined a 0.5¢ local sales tax 
earmarked for school construction and debt retirement. Using data on 100 counties, they found that the 
LOST reduced inequalities in capital outlay funding across districts. They noted an important institutional 
feature that differs from Georgia, however. In Georgia, counties retain the sales tax revenue for sales that 
occur within their boundaries. In North Carolina, the state collects sales taxes and distributes them to 
counties based on population rather than sales. Thus, counties with few retail outlets can still receive 
sales tax revenues. 
Findings from the Current Study 
ESPLOST’S ROLE IN FUNDING INEQUALITY 
Like property taxes, an ESPLOST is a local tax, with revenue remaining in the district in which it was 
collected.2 Therefore, as with property taxes, we would expect to find disparities across districts in the 
amount of revenue collected, even after adjusting for the size of the district. In Georgia, as in all states, a 
variety of state education funding formulas help to offset differences in property tax capacity by 
allocating higher levels of operating funding to districts with lower levels of property wealth per pupil, 
particularly those districts levying higher property tax rates. (See Davis and Ruthotto 2015 and Rubenstein 
and Sjoquist 2003 for a fuller discussion of Georgia’s QBE funding formulas for education.) While Georgia 
does have a capital outlay program to provide resources to districts with high needs and low sales tax 
bases, most capital outlay is financed using local resources.3 Additionally, while ESPLOST revenue can be 
used only for school construction, renovation, capital equipment or debt service on bonds issued for 
                                                            
2 Because revenues are collected at the county level, city school districts must enter tax-sharing agreements with their 
corresponding county school districts. 
3 For a thorough review of Georgia’s capital outlay program, see Walker and Sjoquist (1996). Some of the aspects of the capital 
outlay program have changed since 1996, but much of the report is still relevant to the current capital outlay. See O.C.G.A. § 
20-20-260-263. 
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these purposes, the revenue may be fungible to some extent. In other words, if some districts would have 
used property tax revenue for capital outlay in the absence of the ESPLOST, the tax could have indirectly 
helped to fund operating expenditures or property tax reductions.  
Figure 1 displays a map of Georgia color-coded to show geographic differences in potential ESPLOST 
revenue per full-time equivalent pupil (FTE) by district.4 The map also shows the location of major 
highways. Darker areas indicate higher levels of ESPLOST revenue per FTE. Not surprisingly, the districts in 
metro Atlanta, all have high levels of ESPLOST revenue per FTE. Other high revenue districts are scattered 
around the state and are typically served by major highways, for example, Savannah and Augusta or other 
urban centers. Also note that the districts with the lowest ESPLOST revenue are often contiguous to 
districts with the highest revenues, an issue we discuss further below. 
  
                                                            
4 The analyses in this report use potential ESPLOST revenue, calculated as 1 percent of the sales tax base, rather than actual 
revenue, to account for the small number of districts not levying the ESPLOST. 
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Figure 1. Per Student Potential ESPLOST by School District in School Year 2015 
Table 2 compares the inequality of four funding sources in 2007 (the last pre-recession year) to that in 
2015. Disparities are quantified using five statistics that measure inequality in slightly different ways. The 
Restricted Range examines the extremes by looking at the difference in per FTE revenue for districts at 
the 5th and 95th percentiles of revenue. This measure eliminates districts at the far ends of the 
distribution, but uses data for only two districts (those at the 5th and 95th percentiles) in the calculation. 
The Federal Funding Inequality Index puts the restricted range in context by dividing it by revenues at the 
5th percentile. Lower values indicate greater equality. The Coefficient of Variation is calculated as the 
mean of per pupil funding divided by the standard deviation, with higher numbers indicating greater 
inequality. This measure includes the full distribution of districts. The McLoone Index focuses on districts 
in the bottom half of the distribution, with higher numbers indicating that revenues for districts below 
the median are closer to those in districts above the median (greater equality). The Gini Coefficient, often 
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used to measure income inequality, also uses the full distribution of districts, with lower numbers 
indicating greater equality. Because the Gini Coefficient is a cumulative measure of inequality, it is less 
sensitive to inequality in the extremes and is highly influened by inequality in the middle of the 
distribution.  
Table 2. Inequality in Georgia School Districts Revenues, 2007 and 2015 
 LOCAL PER FTE PLUS STATE PLUS FEDERAL 
PLUS POTENTIAL 
ESPLOST 
 2007 
Restricted Range p95-p5 $4,134 $2,833 $3,556 $4,436 
Federal Funding Inequality Index 3.54 0.43 0.49 0.56 
Coefficient of Variation 0.493 0.126 0.139 0.142 
McLoone Index 0.481 0.844 0.834 0.829 
Gini Coefficient 0.253 0.063 0.068 0.071 
 
2015 
Restricted Range p95-p5 $4,832 $3,947 $4,472 $5,266 
Federal Funding Inequality Index 3.01 0.58 0.60 0.66 
Coefficient of Variation 0.480 0.165 0.169 0.168 
McLoone Index 0.506 0.809 0.808 0.804 
Gini Coefficient 0.243 0.080 0.081 0.083 
The first column in Table 2 shows the results for local, non-ESPLOST revenues only. Not surprisingly, local 
revenues are the most unevenly distributed by every measure, but other than the Restricted Range, the 
measures indicate that the distribution became slightly less unequal between 2007 and 2015.5 State 
revenues are generally distributed inversely to property wealth, so inequality is substantially reduced 
when these revenues are added to local funding. Between 2007 and 2015, however, state funds became 
somewhat less equalizing, as most of the measures show larger inequalities in 2015 than in 2007. Federal 
revenues are largely targeted to high-poverty districts — which may not be the districts with the lowest 
revenues — so their expected effects on inequality are not straightforward.6 Table 2 shows that in both 
years, the addition of federal funds had relatively little effect on overall inequality, likely because they 
account for a small portion of overall revenues. 
The last column in Table 2 adds potential ESPLOST revenue to local, state and federal funding. In both 
years, the addition of ESPLOST revenues leads to larger disparities as measured by the Restricted Range 
and Federal Funding Ratio. Interestingly, however, the measures examining the full range of districts 
(Coefficient of Variation and Gini Coefficient) indicate that the ESPLOST worsened inequalities in 2007 but 
                                                            
5 Warner (2014) similarly found that in the wake of the Great Recession the decline in per student property values was most 
concentrated in previously high wealth districts, effectively lowering property wealth disparities across districts.  
6 Our analyses examine “horizontal equity,” which focuses on the equality of resources irrespective of student needs. “Vertical 
equity” examines whether students with greater needs receive more resources. Federal funding would be expected to improve 
vertical equity but could worsen horizontal equity. 
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had almost no effect on inequalities in 2015, relative to either state and local, or federal, state and  
local revenues.  
Figure 2 also shows how the effect of the ESPLOST on inequality has changed over time by graphing the 
Gini coefficient by year from 2001 to 2015 for total revenues with and without the ESPLOST. There was a 
sharp improvement in equality across districts between 2001 and 2002, coinciding with expansion of 
state equalization grants (Rubenstein and Sjoquist 2003). Inequality largely stayed the same between 
2002 and 2008 but ESPLOST revenue was unequally distributed across districts over the period, leading to 
a more unequal distribution of overall revenues (pink line). Beginning with the start of the Great 
Recession in 2009, inequality of total revenues increased each year until 2012. Inequality of ESPLOST 
funding dropped during the Great Recession so that ESPLOST revenue no longer exacerbated overall 
revenue inequality. By 2014, however, ESPLOST inequality across districts began to grow but no longer 
contributed to an overall increase funding disparities.  
Figure 2. District Level Gini Coefficient 2001-15 
Sources: Georgia Department of Revenue for ESPLOST and Georgia Department of Education DE-46 Detailed Revenue Files 
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The trends presented in Figure 3 shed some light on why the ESPLOST’s impact on inequality has changed 
over time. The figure shows year-to-year changes in ESPLOST revenue per FTE for four quartiles of 
ESPLOST revenue. The first quartile (red) had the lowest sales tax base per student in 2001, and the 
highest quartile (yellow) had the largest sales tax base per student. The quartiles are based on 2001 
revenues so that the groups of counties are consistent over time. 
 Figure 3. Potential ESPLOST 2001-15 by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile 
The figure shows that from 2003-04 through 2006-07, ESPLOST revenue grew consistently across all 
quartiles, with the highest ESPLOST quartile generally experiencing the highest growth. ESPLOST revenue 
contributed to larger inequalities over this period (Figure 2). Revenues began to fall across the top two 
quartiles in 2007-08 and, beginning with the start of the Great Recession in 2008-09, decreased in three 
of the next four years, with essentially flat revenue in 2010-11. The declines were largest in the highest 
ESPLOST districts. Therefore, as ESPLOST revenue overall shrank and disproportionately affected the 
districts with the highest revenues, ESPLOST revenue no longer contributed substantially to greater 
inequality. During this period, inequality overall was growing but ESPLOST revenue was playing an 
increasingly smaller role in that inequality.  
In sum, it appears that the Great Recession led to growing inequality in educational funding in Georgia. At 
the same time, severe declines in sales tax revenue in the districts with the largest sales tax bases led to 
greater equality in the distribution of ESPLOST revenue. Due to increasing inequality in operating 
revenues for education, the ESPLOST no longer exacerbated these inequities in the post-recession years. 
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ESPLOST AND SCHOOL DISTRICT DEBT 
Capital outlay in the public sector generally, and in Georgia school districts specifically, is traditionally 
financed through a mix of municipal bonds and excess current revenue from taxes and other sources 
(Sjoquist and Walker 1996). The ESPLOST allows school districts in Georgia to fully substitute current sales 
tax revenue for long-term debt. For districts with capital outlay needs that exceed ESPLOST revenue, 
long-term debt financing can supplement sales tax revenue. Given the ubiquity of debt as a financing  
source for municipal governments around the United States, it is worth examining the extent to which 
school districts in Georgia have moved away from debt and the extent to which they rely solely on pay-as-
you-go financing.  
Figure 4 compares debt levels per pupil in Georgia to the rest of the United States. Before ESPLOST 
enactment, Georgia was close to the national average in debt per student held by school districts. 
Between 1999 and 2007, debt per student in Georgia fell by approximately $1,000, adjusted for inflation, 
while in the rest of the United States it rose by about $3,200 per student. During the Great Recession, 
with ESPLOST revenues shrinking, districts increased their debt levels, peaking at almost $4,000 per pupil 
in 2009. Debt levels outside Georgia in 2009, however, were over twice as high. Debt per student then 
began to fall in Georgia, while staying roughly constant in the rest of the United States. 
Figure 4. Real Per Pupil Long-Term Debt Held  
Source: National Center For Education Statistics F-33 Data Files 
Inflation adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Producer Price Index for Construction 
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If we assume that in the absence of the ESPLOST, Georgia’s debt levels would have followed a similar 
trajectory to the rest of the United States, then the ESPLOST led to a dramatic decrease in debt levels in 
Georgia compared to what they would have otherwise been. Given Georgia’s fast population growth 
during much of this period, it is also possible that debt for capital outlay would have increased more 
quickly than in the rest of the country in the absence of the ESPLOST. 
Figure 5, which breaks down debt levels within Georgia by quartile of ESPLOST revenue, shows an 
interesting pattern. Districts with the lowest ESPLOST revenues also had the lowest debt per student over 
most of the period, but debt in these districts more than doubled in inflation-adjusted dollars, from 
approximately $1,000 per student in 1996 to over $2,000 per student in 2007. Only districts in the highest 
revenue quartile lowered their debt levels over this period, indicating that ESPLOST-driven debt 
reductions were concentrated in districts with the highest ESPLOST revenues. 
Figure 5. Real Per Student Long-Term Debt Held by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile  
Source: National Center For Education Statistics F-33 Data Files 
Inflation adjusted to 2013 dollars using the Producer Price Index for Construction 
Figure 6 examines how districts’ reliance on debt has affected related property tax rates since the 
ESPLOST became available. School districts have the authority to charge a separate property tax millage 
rate to fund debt service on bonds, so these millage rates provide information about districts’ reliance on 
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property taxes rather than sales taxes to repay debt.7 The figure displays changes in average property tax 
bond millage rates by quartile of ESPLOST revenue. Beginning in 1996 with the start of the ESPLOST 
program, average bond millage rates fell dramatically for all four quartiles. Average rates were initially 
highest in the districts with the most ESPLOST revenue, which also showed the most dramatic decline. For 
example, average rates were approximately 1.3 mills in 1996 and fell to under 0.2 mills by 2015. As might 
be expected given their more limited capacity to substitute sales taxes for property taxes, districts in the 
lowest quartile of ESPLOST revenue showed the smallest drop in bond millage rates over the period, from 
approximately 1 mill to 0.5 mills. The figure shows that districts have drastically reduced their debt 
service payments as they have increasingly relied on ESPLOST revenue to fund capital outlay. The chart 
also shows the gap between high and low revenue districts. High revenue districts have gone from having 
the highest bond millage rates before ESPLOST to an average close to zero, while the lowest revenue 
districts now have the highest property tax rates to pay back debt. 
Figure 6. Average Bond Millage Rates 1995-2015 by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile  
*Includes only districts charging a bond millage rate 
  
                                                            
7 Districts also have the ability to finance capital outlay by issuing other forms of short-term debt like revenue anticipation notes 
or certificates of participation. Data on the use of these types of debt are limited. The analyses here focus on long-term debt 
issuance — debt obligations with a repayment period longer than one year. 
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Table 3 shows the number of districts over time charging a millage rate to fund bond debt service 
payments, and the average millage rate for those levying the tax. Charging a bond millage rate indicates 
that the district has outstanding debt, but it does not necessarily mean the debt was issued in the current 
year. The property tax revenue could be used to meet debt service obligations on debt issued in the past. 
As shown in the table, most Georgia districts (102 out of 180) had outstanding debt backed by the 
property tax in 1996, just prior to the start of the ESPLOST program. When ESPLOST became an option, 
the number of districts repaying debt directly through property tax millage declined dramatically, falling 
to 28 districts (15.5 percent) by 2015. 
Table 3. Millage Rates for Bond Debt Service 
SCHOOL 
YEAR 
NO. OF DISTRICTS CHARGING 
A BOND MILLAGE RATE  
AVERAGE 
RATE  
25TH 
PERCENTILE 
75TH 
PERCENTILE 
1995 97 1.869 0.96 2.59 
1996 102 1.969 1 2.8 
1997 69 1.750 1 2.32 
1998 57 1.633 1 2.31 
1999 52 1.553 0.971 2.11 
2000 51 1.519 1 1.98 
2001 48 1.481 0.955 1.92 
2002 43 1.311 0.71 1.835 
2003 41 1.408 0.8 1.835 
2004 42 1.394 0.8 1.75 
2005 42 1.362 0.699 1.75 
2006 38 1.365 0.65 1.878 
2007 37 1.42 0.67 1.838 
2008 39 1.505 0.65 2.45 
2009 37 1.469 0.599 2.2 
2010 35 1.542 0.65 2.2 
2011 32 1.623 0.66 2.359 
2012 29 1.610 0.65 2.173 
2013 29 1.751 0.671 2.3 
2014 28 1.739 0.658 2.359 
2015 28 1.781 0.673 2.704 
From the taxpayer’s perspective, in those districts levying a bond millage rate, the rates were low, 
averaging less than 2 mills over the entire period and not exceeding 3 mills even for districts at the 75th 
percentile of tax rates. For the owner of a home with a market value of $153,900 (about the median 
home price in Georgia), a 2-mill tax would translate into property tax payments of $123 per year.8  
                                                            
8 Residential property in Georgia is usually taxed on 40 percent of its assessed market value. In 2015, Decatur City Schools taxed 
at 50 percent, and Gainesville City and Dalton City Schools taxed at 100 percent. This calculation ignores any property tax 
exemptions to which the homeowner may be entitled.  
14 
cslf.gsu.edu Georgia’s ESPLOST: Review of Trends and Policy Implications 
COMPARISON OF PROPERTY AND SALES TAXES FOR CAPITAL OUTLAY 
Figure 7 examines household ESPLOST and property tax payments by comparing the bond millage rate 
that would be required in each district to replace ESPLOST revenue in 2015. This comparison assumes 
that districts would be able to fund the same level of capital outlay from either the current ESPLOST or a 
property tax millage rate at the level shown in the chart. While there are several extreme outliers — 
districts that would need a bond millage rate over 10 to replace ESPLOST revenue — most districts are 
clustered between 2 and 4 mills. Therefore, for most districts, it would be feasible to substitute property 
tax revenue for sales taxes. For those with particularly low ESPLOST revenue, it would likely be possible to 
raise more revenue from a relatively low property tax of 4 to 5 mills.9 Note, however, that if a district 
chose to eliminate the ESPLOST and issue municipal bonds backed by property tax revenues instead, a 
homeowner in that county would pay the additional millage rate plus the ESPLOST on any purchases in 
other counties with the tax.  
Figure 7. Necessary Bond Millage Rate Required to Raise ESPLOST Equivalent 
Amount of Revenue in 2015 By ESPLOST Rank 
  
                                                            
9 A 5-mill tax on a property valued at $150,000 would cost the homeowner an additional $300 per year in property taxes. 
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Figure 8 shows a district perspective of how much potential revenue could be raised in each district 
through a 2-mill property tax as compared to a 1¢ sales tax. For the approximately 20 districts with the 
lowest potential ESPLOST revenue, the two taxes generate roughly the same amount of revenue. Virtually 
all of the remaining districts would raise more from the ESPLOST, with particularly large gaps for the 10 
districts with the highest ESPLOST revenues per FTE. Table 4 looks at this issue more directly by quartile 
of ESPLOST wealth. Across all quartiles, the median household spends more on the ESPLOST than it would 
on a 2-mill property tax, with a difference of almost two to one in the bottom two quartiles. 
Figure 8. Per FTE Annual Potential ESPLOST vs. Per FTE Bond Property Tax 
Revenues in 2015 By ESPLOST Rank 
Table 4. Average Property Tax and ESPLOST by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile 
 1 (SMALLEST) 2 3 4 (LARGEST) 
 TAXES PAID BY AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD 
Average Median House Value at 2 Mills $72.54 $75.67 $106.58 $109.17 
ESPLOST Paid Overall $155.96 $154.89 $166.75 $163.61 
ESPLOST Paid in Local County $123.33 $141.78 $150.61 $149.31 
The statewide median home value is $153,900 and is heavily influenced by the large number of homes in the metro-Atlanta area. 
The district averages in this table are lower because they are across districts, ignoring their relative number of homes, and the 
majority of districts have a lower median home value than the statewide median. 
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TAX EXPORTING 
One difficulty in comparing property tax burdens to sales tax burdens is that sales taxes are generally 
more exportable than property taxes. While some property owners may live outside the school districts in 
which they pay property tax (such as vacation or investment property owners), it is more common for 
people to pay sales taxes outside their home counties. The higher the share of retail sales in a school 
district made by individuals who reside outside the district, the larger the share of district capital outlay 
that is financed by nonresidents. Like the sales tax base itself, the ability to export sales taxes varies 
considerably across districts. In most cases, buyers do not report their county of residence when making 
purchases; therefore, the extent of tax exporting must be estimated based on consumer purchasing 
surveys and the location of retail businesses. 
In districts with little retail activity, particularly grocery stores, it is likely that residents must travel outside 
the county to shop. Figure 9 looks at this issue by showing census blocks (shaded) in which the nearest 
grocery store is in another county. Residents in these neighborhoods most likely shop outside the county, 
sending potential tax revenue to neighboring districts. The map shows very few shaded areas in metro 
Atlanta, aside from some census blocks on county borders, indicating that, not surprisingly, most metro-
Atlanta residents can shop in their home county.10 Grocery stores tend to be concentrated in urban areas, 
particularly in the metro-Atlanta districts, Bibb County (Macon), Chatham County (Savannah), Glynn 
County (Brunswick and St. Simons Island), Richmond County (Augusta) and Muscogee County (Columbus). 
In contrast, several counties are nearly completely shaded, indicating that there are almost no retail 
grocery outlets in the county and that most residents must, by necessity, do most of their shopping 
outside the county. Most of these districts also rank very low in terms of ESPLOST revenue per pupil, 
including Glascock County (5th lowest), Wilcox County (10th), Wheeler County (18th), Taliaferro (20th), 
Webster (23rd) and Lee County (36th). It is important to note that if these districts repealed the ESPLOST 
in favor of additional property taxes, residents in these counties would still pay ESPLOST on purchases 
outside the county, thereby potentially exacerbating their tax burdens.  
                                                            
10 Note that this map does not show where people actually shop, but simply whether they have the option to shop in their home 
county. 
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Figure 9. “Leaving” Census Blocks for Grocery Stores in Georgia in School Year 2015 
Note: Red indicates a census block whose closest grocery store is outside of its county. White indicates either a census block with 
no households or a census block with a closest grocery store located within its county. 
Given the concentration of retail outlets throughout metro Atlanta and the geographic proximity of the 
districts to each other, these districts likely both import and export tax burdens. Atlanta and Fulton 
County, which serve as retail and employment centers, particularly benefit from tax importation, 
however, and their school districts have the third and fifth highest ESPLOST revenues per student, 
respectively. In more rural parts of the state, counties with retail centers particularly benefit from 
importation if nearby counties lack retail establishments. For example, Bibb County benefits not only 
from having a retail center in Macon, but also from being located near counties such as Twiggs that have 
very few retail outlets.  
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Table 5 attempts to quantify tax exporting by examining “leaving shares” by quartile of ESPLOST revenue. 
The analysis uses the location of all grocery stores, home stores, gas stations and clothing stores in 
Georgia that were included in the fiscal year 2015 Department of Labor employment files, geocoded with 
their specific latitude and longitude coordinates.11 Each census block in Georgia is then linked to its 
closest retailer of each type. In most cases, this retailer was in the same county as that census block’s 
centroid point. The share of a county’s households whose closest retailer was in a different county is used 
to create a “leaving share,”12 which estimates the percentage of households in each county purchasing 
goods outside the county. Higher leaving shares are therefore expected to be strongly correlated with 
greater numbers of households crossing county borders to purchase retail goods on which they must pay 
ESPLOST.  
Table 5. Leaving Shares by 2015 Per FTE Potential ESPLOST Quartile 
 1 (SMALLEST) 2 3 4 (LARGEST) 
Count of Districts 45 45 45 45 
Average Leaving Share 30.4% 18.3% 10.4% 9.5% 
Range of Leaving 
Shares 
0.3%-
86.4% 
0.2%-
100.0% 
1.0%-
36.6% 
1.2%-
53.6% 
As expected, districts with lower potential ESPLOST revenue also have the highest average leaving shares, 
and those with the highest ESPLOST revenue have the lowest leaving shares. Districts in the lowest 
quartile of ESPLOST wealth average 30.4 percent of households likely shopping outside the district, while 
those in the highest quartile average less than 10 percent shopping elsewhere.  
Table 6 sheds further light on this issue by looking at exporting outside Georgia’s urban and suburban 
districts. Not surprisingly, rural “distant” and rural “remote” districts, as classified by the U.S. Department 
of Education, have particularly high levels of potential exporting, with over 30 percent of households 
having the nearest retail outlets outside the district. Rural fringe districts, as well as districts in or near a 
town, have much lower levels of potential exporting, on average. Fifty-five of Georgia’s 180 districts are 
considered rural distant or remote, and another 60 are classified as rural fringe.  
  
                                                            
11 Grocery store purchases of food and food ingredients for at-home consumption are exempt from the state sales tax but are 
charged local sales taxes including ESPLOST.  
12 The equation for the leaving share for a certain type of retail purchase is calculated as 𝐿𝑆𝑐𝑟 =  
𝐿𝐻𝑐𝑟
𝑇𝐻𝑐𝑟
 , where c indexes county, r 
indexes retail type, LH is leaving households and TH is total households. A school system’s leaving share is the average across the 
various retail leaving shares. For city systems, the leaving share for their primary host county proxies for their leaving share 
because ESPLOST is collected by county and then shared between the applicable school systems based on student population or 
some other agreed upon method. 
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Table 6. Rural School Districts’ Leaving Share by Urbanization School Year 2015 
 
TOWN: 
FRINGE 
TOWN: 
DISTANT 
TOWN: 
REMOTE 
RURAL: 
FRINGE 
RURAL: 
DISTANT 
RURAL: 
REMOTE 
Count of Districts 2 24 11 60 40 15 
Average Leaving Share 4.4% 12.1% 8.3% 13.1% 31.7% 31.0% 
Range of  Leaving Shares 
2.2%-
6.6% 
1.0%-
35.3% 
2.4%-
20.6% 
0.2%-
49.0% 
0.6%-
86.4% 
1.1%-
100.0% 
Note: The National Center for Education Statistics provides each school district’s level of urbanization. “Town” indicates the 
existence of a small population center, and “rural” indicates no population center. “Fringe” indicates close proximity to a large 
urbanized area, “distant” indicates farther away from an urbanized area, and “remote” indicates extremely distant from an 
urbanized area. 
In sum, these analyses demonstrate that many districts have limited capacity to raise revenues through a 
sales tax because they lack substantial retail activity. Districts in counties with no urban areas, particularly 
very rural districts, have substantial potential “leakage” of sales tax revenues to nearby districts. 
Moreover, large shares of residents in many counties are likely paying ESPLOST revenue to neighboring 
counties, adding to location-based disparities in resources available to pay for school capital outlay. 
ESPLOST AND CAPITAL OUTLAY 
Debt and ESPLOST revenues are used to finance capital outlay. Thus, we also examine trends in capital 
outlay for education over the same period to assess the extent to which they are related to debt and pay-
as-you-go revenues. Figure 10 displays per pupil capital outlay from 1995 to 2015 by quartile of ESPLOST 
wealth. Following the start of the ESPLOST program, overall capital outlay increased consistently until 
2009, then fell dramatically during the Great Recession. The capital outlay patterns by quartiles of 
ESPLOST wealth are fairly volatile, however. This volatility is understandable as capital outlay is typically 
“lumpy.” Districts may only need to make large expenditures irregularly as facilities are built or renovated. 
Despite the volatility, some consistent patterns do emerge. Most notable is that capital outlay per pupil in 
the highest ESPLOST revenue districts consistently exceeds that in the lower quartile districts. The lowest 
quartile districts had the lowest capital outlay throughout the study period, except between 2010 and 
2012. By 2015, capital outlay in the lowest quartile of districts was approximately $600 per pupil lower 
than the next-lowest-spending quartile, and approximately $900 per pupil lower than the highest revenue 
quartile. This gap was still far smaller than in the early 2000s, when capital outlay differences between 
the highest and lowest revenue quartiles reached as much as $1,300 per pupil.  
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Figure 10. Real Per FTE Capital Outlay by 2001 ESPLOST Quartile 
Source: Georgia Department of Education Detailed Expenditure DE-46 Files 
Inflation adjusted to 2015 dollars using the BEA Construction Chain Price Index 
Capital outlay in the highest quartile districts increased substantially with the start of the ESPLOST 
program in 1996, growing from $728 per pupil to $1,963 in 2001. While spending in the highest revenue 
districts regularly exceeded that in all other quartiles in the early 2000s, the gaps between the top three 
quartiles narrowed considerably during the mid-2000s and disappeared beginning in 2009 as spending 
fell dramatically in all districts. By 2015, spending in the top three quartiles remained similar, while a large 
gap opened up between the bottom quartile and the top three. 
Capital outlay spending is not necessarily the same as capital outlay need. Policymakers might be less 
concerned about high levels of spending in districts with large sales tax bases and more concerned with 
ensuring that all students are taught in safe, uncrowded schools in acceptable conditions and with the 
necessary facilities. In the language of school finance, they may be more concerned with having adequate 
school facilities for all students than with ensuring an equitable distribution of facilities. Capital needs are 
influenced by a variety of factors, including student enrollment growth, the age of facilities and the 
condition of facilities. While all districts typically have some level of unmet capital needs, the greatest 
needs are likely to be in the fastest growing districts, which are likely to need new schools, and in districts 
with facilities in the worst condition. Therefore, lower spending on capital outlay could reflect lower 
facility needs or a lower capacity to finance construction through the ESPLOST or the issuance of debt. 
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Table 7 compares districts by quartile of ESPLOST wealth and by quartile of student enrollment growth. 
The 14 districts in the upper left cell have both slow growth and low ESPLOST revenues; these are the 
districts in which we would expect low capital outlay spending. The 18 districts in the bottom right cell 
have high growth rates and high ESPLOST revenues; these are the districts in which we would expect high 
capital outlay spending. 
Table 7. Student Growth and ESPLOST Quartile Ranks 
 ESPLOST QUARTILE 2001 
STUDENT GROWTH RATE 
QUARTILE  1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
1 14 11 13 7 45 
2 17 13 8 7 45 
3 7 14 11 13 45 
4 7 7 13 18 45 
Total 45 45 45 45 180 
Pearson Rank Correlation Coefficient: .293 
As the table shows, however, growth is not perfectly correlated with ESPLOST revenue. For example, 
seven districts have low growth but high revenues (upper right cell), and seven districts have high growth 
but low revenues (bottom left cell). We next look at the top and bottom half of the distribution. Thirty-
five districts (19.4 percent) in the upper half of student growth are in the lower half of ESPLOST revenues, 
indicating that they likely have higher capital outlay needs but lower revenues. The Pearson rank 
correlation between growth rates and ESPLOST revenues is 0.293, suggesting that the two are positively 
related but that the relationship is not particularly strong. Thus, higher capital outlay expenditures are not 
driven solely by higher student population growth, one indicator of higher needs. 
Table 8 uses multiple regression analysis to examine the independent effects of student growth and 
ESPLOST revenue on capital outlay expenditures. Both variables have independent and statistically 
significant positive effects on capital outlay per FTE. The model includes district fixed effects, which 
control for all unobserved time-invariant district characteristics (e.g., location), and school year fixed 
effects, which control for underlying trends in capital outlay spending. The growth rate coefficient 
indicates that a one percentage point increase in the student growth rate is associated with 
approximately $21 higher per FTE capital expenditures, while a $1 increase in ESPLOST revenues is 
associated with a $1.02 increase in capital expenditures.13  
  
                                                            
13 Note that the coefficient is greater than $1.00, suggesting that little to no ESPLOST revenues are leaked to other purposes.  
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Table 8. Regression Results, Capital Outlay Per FTE 
VARIABLES REAL PER FTE CAPITAL OUTLAY 
Three-Year Student Growth Rate 21.40** 
 (8.965) 
Real Per FTE ESPLOST Revenues 1.019*** 
 (0.147) 
District Level Fixed Effects Yes 
School Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Constant 163.0 
 (148.9) 
Observations 2,700 
Number of districts 180 
R-squared: Within, Between, Overall (W:.0704)(B:.367)(O:.101) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
It is difficult to compare the effects of the growth rates and ESPLOST revenues because they are 
measured in different scales. To make them comparable, we examine the effects of a one standard 
deviation increase in each on capital outlay. For three-year enrollment growth, a one standard deviation 
increase (9.3 percent) is associated with an increase of $199 in capital outlay. A one standard deviation 
increase in real per FTE ESPLOST revenues ($434.03) is associated with $442 in capital outlay. Thus, 
capital outlay appears to be slightly more strongly related to ESPLOST revenue than to enrollment 
growth. 
The other possible driver of capital outlay is facility needs, but data on the condition of school facilities in 
Georgia are limited. For these analyses, we rely on the capital outlay needs identified in local facility 
plans. Capital outlay needs include two measures: 1) total need as identified in the local facilities plans 
submitted by each district to the Facilities Services Division of the Georgia Department of Education, and 
2) eligible need approved for state capital outlay grants. A weakness of the first measure is that districts 
with higher expected revenues to finance capital outlay, such as ESPLOST, might include more locally 
financed facility needs in their plans. A weakness of the second measure is that it includes only capital 
outlay approved by the state. Moreover, because the plans are developed by the districts, those with 
more funding may develop more extensive and expensive plans than those with less funding. 
Figure 11 plots the relationship between eligible needs and ESPLOST revenue. We focus on eligible needs 
because the state applies the same criteria across districts for determining eligible capital outlay costs. 
Consequently, these estimates are likely to be more comparable across districts than total needs. The 
figure shows a very slight downward slope, indicating that districts with lower ESPLOST revenue per pupil 
tend to have higher needs per student FTE. The slope is small and there is considerable variation across 
districts, suggesting a weak relationship between revenue and needs, at best. The negative slope could 
indicate that low ESPLOST revenue has not allowed low revenue districts to meet their past capital outlay 
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needs. Because these are cross-sectional data, however, it is possible that districts with higher levels of 
ESPLOST revenue were able to reduce their capital outlay needs in previous years. Figure 12, which 
displays the relationship between total needs and ESPLOST revenue, shows an even weaker relationship 
between the two variables. 
Figure 11. Potential ESPLOST in 2015 and “Eligible Need”  
Figure 12. Potential ESPLOST in 2015 and “Total Need”  
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Figure 13 examines the relationship between student growth and eligible capital outlay needs. The 
relationship is weak but is, surprisingly, slightly negative. This result suggests that the fastest growing 
districts have, on average, somewhat lower capital outlay needs than districts with lower or even 
negative growth rates. Again, this may indicate that fast-growing districts have been able to meet their 
capital outlay needs in previous years through higher state funding. While the relationship between 
growth and needs is weak, it does suggest that the greatest facility needs are not necessarily found in the 
fastest growing districts.  
Figure 13. Student Population Growth 2001-15 and “Eligible Need”  
Summary and Recommendations 
Overall, these data present a somewhat complex story regarding capital outlay and funding sources in 
Georgia. The ESPLOST undoubtedly contributed to large increases in capital outlay spending along with 
decreasing reliance on debt, compared to the rest of the United States (Brunner and Warner 2012). 
These patterns were not uniform across districts, however, as districts with the highest ESPLOST revenues 
were able to fund considerably more capital outlay than other districts while not taking on more debt.  
An interesting pattern emerges for the districts with the lowest ESPLOST revenue. Not surprisingly, these 
districts spent considerably less on capital outlay than other districts. However, they also had relatively 
low millage rates for debt service suggesting a reluctance to spend on capital outlay if it could not be paid 
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for with current sales tax revenue. Many of these districts would be able to raise more revenue for capital 
outlay from a relatively low (4 to 5 mill) property tax than from the ESPLOST.  
The data also show the substantial effect of the Great Recession on revenue inequality in Georgia. 
Beginning in 2007, there was an increasing pattern of revenue inequality. Because the highest revenue 
districts saw sharp declines in ESPLOST revenue, though, the ESPLOST no longer caused an increase in 
overall inequality. 
We find large disparities in sales tax bases across the state and considerable potential for tax exporting 
across districts, particularly in rural parts of the state. These patterns suggest that many districts, 
especially those with few retail outlets that are located near districts with a greater concentration of 
stores, may experience substantial exportation of sales tax revenue to nearby districts. Net importing 
districts benefit from collecting sales taxes from nonresidents, while net exporters may have a limited 
capacity to raise revenue for capital outlay from the ESPLOST. 
Policymakers might be particularly concerned if districts with the greatest capital outlay needs also have 
the weakest ability to raise revenue through the ESPLOST. Unfortunately, the available data on capital 
outlay needs are very limited. We do find that districts experiencing high enrollment growth have tended 
to have higher capital outlay spending, but gaps between higher and lower growth districts have 
narrowed considerably in the post-recession years. We also find little correlation between facility needs, 
as identified on local facility plans, and ESPLOST revenues. 
To address inequities in the ability of school districts across the state to fund needed capital outlays 
through the ESPLOST, we recommend that the state examine several options. 
 Explore sales tax base sharing. Our analysis of geographic disparities in sales tax bases shows clearly 
that many school districts in Georgia, particularly those in the most rural areas, have limited capacity to 
raise revenue through sales taxes. A number of districts have few or no retail outlets, such as grocery 
stores, located within their boundaries, and these disparities are exacerbated by the location of retail 
centers in nearby districts that draw sales tax revenue from nonresidents. To help break the link 
between the quality of a district’s school facilities and the happenstance of retail locations, the state 
could explore regional sales tax sharing plans. Such plans could draw on existing state-defined regions 
like the Department of Education’s Regional Education Service Areas or the Department of Community 
Affairs’ Service Delivery Regions, or could implement newly defined regional borders. Within each 
region, some or all ESPLOST revenues could be distributed across member districts using a 
predetermined formula.14 
  
                                                            
14 A per FTE allocation would be the simplest to implement, but many other options exist that would allow for better targeting to 
district needs. 
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A tax base sharing plan would, in most cases, reduce ESPLOST revenue in districts that include the 
regional commercial center in order to provide additional revenue to surrounding districts. Thus, it 
would be necessary to ensure that districts potentially losing revenue are able to meet their capital 
outlay needs during a phase-in period. Additionally, ESPLOST renewal under such a plan would likely 
require approval by voters in each district, or a majority across all districts. 
 Develop incentives and technical support for borrowing in low ESPLOST districts. Since the ESPLOST 
program began in 1996, sales tax revenues have largely replaced property tax-backed debt as the 
primary method for financing school capital outlay. The extremely high rate of ESPLOST renewal across 
the state suggests that voters prefer sales taxes to property taxes for this purpose. As the analyses in 
this report demonstrate, however, the ESPLOST raises limited revenue in many districts and, in fact, can 
sometimes represent a greater tax burden for typical households than would additional property taxes 
for capital outlay. For these districts, using property taxes to fund pay-as-you-go construction or to pay 
the debt service on bonds issued for that purpose may be a more effective option, despite many voters’ 
distaste for both debt and property taxes. Incentives could include: 
 Matching grants for districts with low debt that issue bonds: Georgia already provides capital outlay 
grants to districts with low wealth. For districts with severe needs (such as unsafe or overcrowded 
facilities), the state could provide additional incentives in the form of matching grants if the districts 
are willing to borrow to finance additional capital outlay. These grants could help districts leverage 
additional resources for capital outlay at a relatively low cost to the state. Such grants should only be 
available to districts with low existing debt levels.  
 State credit enhancement to lower interest rates: Smaller districts or those with limited experience in 
credit markets may face additional borrowing costs such as higher interest rates or premium 
payments for commercial bond insurance. In such cases, the state could guarantee debt service 
payments to creditors to lower interest costs. Texas, for example, has the Texas Permanent School 
Fund, which uses dedicated revenue from state land to guarantee school district bonds, thereby 
lowering interest rates and debt service costs (see Duncombe and Wang 2009). 
 Create a state bond bank: A bond bank pools bond issues by local government entities to achieve lower 
borrowing costs. Small school districts with limited tax bases and borrowing experience may face higher 
interest rates due to higher potential credit risk. Bond banks are typically able to borrow at lower 
interest costs and pass the savings on to local government issuers. Additionally, by pooling smaller bond 
issues into a single larger issue, economies of scale can also reduce borrowing costs. Bond banks are 
typically intended to be self-supporting through fees from local government borrowers. A bond bank 
could provide low-cost, easy-to-access financing for school districts at little or no cost to the state. 
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Appendix: Data Sources and Methods 
Table A1. Data Sources 
TABLE OR FIGURE NUMBER DATA SOURCE 
Table 1 Georgia Department of Revenue Sales Tax History Chart, version effective April 1, 2016. 
Table 2 Georgia Department of Education DE-46 Revenues Files for Local, State, and Federal 
Revenue. Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST 
and LOST monthly collections. 
Table 3 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Consolidation Sheet data for 
school bond digest data. The 2015 American Community Survey for school district 
median home values and census block household counts. Georgia Department of 
Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections. 
Consumer Expenditure Survey data for average southern household consumption by 
retail categories. Georgia Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and 
Employment for retail locations. 
Table 4 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Millage Rate Annual Report. 
Table 5 The 2015 American Community Survey for household counts. Georgia Department of 
Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment for retail locations. 
Table 6 The 2015 American Community Survey for census block household counts. Georgia 
Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment for retail locations. 
National Center for Education Statistics F-33 Data Files for district level of urbanization. 
Table 7 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts.  
Table 8 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
National Center for Education Statistics and Georgia Department of Education DE-46 
Revenues Files for annual capital outlay. Inflation adjustment for 2015 constant dollars 
using Construction Chain Price Index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Figure 1 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
Figure 2 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
Georgia Department of Education DE-46 Revenues Files for total federal revenue. 
Figure 3 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
Figure 4 National Center for Education Statistics F-33 Data Files for long-term debt held. Inflation 
adjustment for 2015 constant dollars using Construction Producer Price Index from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Figure 5 National Center for Education Statistics F-33 Data Files for long-term debt held. Inflation 
adjustment for 2015 constant dollars using Construction Producer Price Index from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services 
data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections. 
Figure 6 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Millage Rate Annual Report. 
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TABLE OR FIGURE NUMBER DATA SOURCE 
Figure 7 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services Consolidation Sheet data for 
school bond digest data. The 2015 American Community Survey for school district 
median home values and census block household counts. Georgia Department of 
Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections. 
Consumer Expenditure Survey data for average southern household consumption by 
retail categories. Georgia Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and 
Employment for retail locations. 
Figure 8 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services 
Consolidation Sheet data for school bond digest data.  
Figure 10 The 2015 American Community Survey for school district for census block household 
counts. Georgia Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment for 
retail locations. 
Figure 11 National Center for Education Statistics and Georgia Department of Education DE-46 
Revenues Files for annual capital outlay. Georgia Department of Revenue Local 
Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST monthly collections. Inflation 
adjustment for 2015 constant dollars using Construction Chain Price Index from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Figure 12 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
Georgia Department of Education Facilities Division local facility plan data for district 
eligible need. 
Figure 13 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
Georgia Department of Education Facilities Division Local facility plan data for district 
total need. 
Figure 14 Georgia Department of Revenue Local Government Services data for ESPLOST and LOST 
monthly collections. Georgia Department of Education fall full-time equivalent counts. 
Inequality Measures: 
This section describes how we calculate the inequality measures and provides their equations. In all 
cases, n indicates the number of districts, ∑ is the summation operator, √ is the square root operator, 
and r indicates rank. 
The Restricted Range is calculated as the difference between the 95th percentile district in per full-time 
equivalent (FTE) and the 5th percentile district: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = (
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
)95𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 −  (
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
)5𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡   
The Federal Funding Inequality Index is the Restricted Range divided by the 5th percentile district’s 
amount: 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒
(
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
)5𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
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Coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation of the district’s per student revenues to the 
average: 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  √∑
((
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
− 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
))2 
(𝑛 − 1)
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  
∑
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
𝑛
 
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
 
The McLoone Index is calculated as the ratio of the per FTE revenues of the districts below the median of 
per FTE revenues to the per FTE revenues of the above-median districts.  
𝑀𝑐𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  
∑(
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
)𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
∑(
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
)𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑠
 
The Gini coefficient is calculated as the distance between the ranked cumulative per FTE wealth curve 
and the curve that would exist under perfect equity.  
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
1
𝑛
(𝑛 + 1 − 2
∑(𝑛 + 1 − 𝑟)
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
∑
𝑅𝑒𝑣
𝐹𝑇𝐸
) 
The “Leaving Share” Calculation and the Estimate of ESPLOST Paid in Home County 
The Consumer Expenditure Survey provides estimates of household unit average annual expenditure by 
category and household before-tax income. These estimates can then be isolated to only include 
ESPLOST-eligible expenditures (Table A2). These annual estimates multiplied by the count of households 
within these income categories for a school district serves as the estimate for ESPLOST paid by district 
residents. These estimates, therefore, differ across districts by number of households as well as their level 
of household wealth.  
To account for ESPLOST-eligible purchases that could have been made outside of a resident’s home 
school district, we calculated “leaving shares.” These shares are expected to be correlated with the 
percentage of a school district’s residents traveling outside of their county to make ESPLOST-eligible 
purchases.  
Using the Quarterly Census of Wages and Employment data for all employers in Georgia, grocery stores, 
gas stations, home stores, department stores, and restaurants were geocoded by their physical location. 
Then each census block in Georgia, the smallest geographic unit available, was assigned their closest 
business. The ratio of households whose closest grocery store is outside of their home county to the total 
number of households in their county is that county’s grocery store “leaving share.” Each school district’s 
leaving share is then the weighted average of their leaving shares across the retail types. The annual 
housing unit amount of expenditure in that category serves as the weight. 
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Table A2. Annual Household ESPLOST-Eligible Expenditures by Income Group 
 
LESS 
THAN 
$10K 
$10K TO 
$15K 
$15K TO 
$20K 
$20K TO 
$30K 
$30K TO 
$40K 
$40K TO 
$50K 
$50K TO 
$70K 
MORE 
THAN 
$70K 
Groceries1 $2,971 $3,211 $3,344 $4,113 $4,422 $4,844 $5,392 $7,367 
Clothes $612 $595 $836 $748 $1,055 $1,341 $1,515 $2,251 
Home 
Furnishings or 
Equipment $580 $437 $519 $777 $869 $1,051 $1,212 $2,139 
Gasoline2 $1,286 $1,295 $1,472 $1,915 $2,331 $2,651 $3,100 $4,454 
Utilities3 $2,172 $2,208 $2,607 $3,072 $3,367 $3,406 $3,750 $5,173 
Restaurant $950 $844 $1,046 $1,253 $1,703 $2,062 $2,579 $3,846 
Source: Consumer Expenditure Survey Table 3123 southern region by income before taxes: Average annual expenditures and 
characteristics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2013-14.  
1 Food purchased for at-home consumption is exempt from state sales tax, but local sales taxes are charged on groceries.  
2 The Transportation Funding Act of 2015 changed the taxation of motor fuels in Georgia but largely left in place the local sales 
taxation on gasoline.  
3 This includes purchases of natural gas, electricity, home phones and cell phones, which are all charged local sales taxes. 
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